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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (2006) and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006). On June 2, 2011 the district court granted the United
States’ motion for summary judgment, noting that the plaintiff
has no standing. The States of New Union and Progress each
filed a timely notice of appeal. The district court’s order is a final
decision, and this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (2006).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I. Whether the State of New Union has standing in its
sovereign capacity as owner and regulator of the
groundwater in the state or in its parens patriae capacity as
protector of its citizens who have an interest in the
groundwater in the state.
II. Whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(“Corps”) has jurisdiction to issue a permit under Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006), because
Lake Temp is navigable water under CWA §§ 301(a), 404(a),
and 402(7), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1344(a), 1362(7).
III. Whether the Corps has jurisdiction to issue a permit under
CWA § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, or the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) has jurisdiction to issue a permit
under CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 for the discharge of
slurry into Lake Temp.
IV. Whether the decision by the Office of Management and
Budget (“OMB”) that the Corps had jurisdiction under CWA
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, and that EPA did not have
jurisdiction under CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, to issue a
permit for the Department of Defense (“DOD”) to discharge
slurry into Lake Temp and EPA’s decision violated the
CWA.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The DOD was issued a permit by the Corps under CWA § 404
to discharge a slurry of spent munitions into Lake Temp.
Situated on military property, Lake Temp is a lake located
completely within the State of Progress. The lake measures three
miles wide and nine miles long during years with more rain. It is
smaller in dry seasons, and dries up once every five years on
average. Lake Temp attracts boaters who enjoy duck hunting on
the opposite side of the lake from the only road in the area. A
significant portion of these hunters and boaters travel across
state lines.
The State of New Union filed suit, arguing that the discharge
project required a permit from EPA under CWA § 402 rather
than a § 404 permit from the Corps. The State of Progress
intervened in the case, and then all parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. The district court granted the United
States’ motion for summary judgment on June 2, 2011, finding
that New Union lacks standing to bring suit and providing an
opinion on the merits of the case as well. New Union and
Progress appeal this decision.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court properly granted summary judgment on
the United States’ motion and was correct in denying New
Union’s motion.
As a threshold issue, the State of New Union lacks standing
to challenge the Corps’ jurisdiction to issue a CWA permit. New
Union has not demonstrated standing pursuant to the
requirements of Article III, particularly its injury requirement.
Additionally, New Union is estopped from challenging the permit,
because it failed to object to DOD’s EIS.
The district court properly decided that Lake Temp is subject
to CWA jurisdiction because it is “within the description of water
bodies that have traditionally been held to be navigable.” In the
alternative, the lakebed where the project will take place meets
the significant nexus test and thus is subject to CWA jurisdiction.
Additionally, Lake Temp satisfies the continuous surface
connection test because it is a relatively permanent body of water

3

2012]

BEST BRIEF: APPELLEE-CROSS-APPELLANT

77

forming a lake. Thus, the district court’s decision regarding the
navigability of Lake Temp should be affirmed.
Third, the district court properly held that the Corps has
authority to issue discharge permits under § 404, and both the
Corps’ and EPA’s interpretations are consistent with this
understanding of the statute. Additionally, the slurry that DOD
proposes to discharge falls squarely within the definition of fill
material that both agencies have promulgated. As a result, the
district court was correct in holding that the permit was properly
issued under § 404.
Finally, EPA’s decision not to veto the permit did not violate
the CWA because the statute mandated consultation with the
Corps. In the alternative, the decision is not subject to judicial
review because it is a discretionary agency decision not to bring
an enforcement action. If the decision is subject to judicial
review, it was not arbitrary or capricious.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Questions of law are evaluated by this Court and should be
reviewed de novo. Theriot, Inc. v. United States, 245 F.3d 388, 395
(5th Cir. 1998). Review of federal agency action is governed by
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006), and can
be overturned if the action:
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that is could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or to the product of agency
expertise.

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD
THAT NEW UNION DOES NOT HAVE
STANDING TO CONTEST THE CORPS’
ISSUANCE OF A CWA PERMIT.

The State of New Union has not established Article III
standing requirements to challenge the CWA § 404 permit issued
by the Corps. Specifically, New Union has not suffered an injury
under traditional Article III standing requirements, or under the
majority’s relaxed standard in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S.
497 (2007). Moreover, New Union should be estopped from
seeking judicial review of the Corps’ decision to issue a § 404
discharge permit because it failed to object to concerns in the EIS
prepared by the Corps.
A . New Union does not meet Article III standing
requirements.
Federal-court jurisdiction is limited to “Cases” and
“Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Limiting federal
jurisdiction to proper cases and controversies ensures that the
Federal Judiciary respects “the proper . . . role of the courts in a
democratic society.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)) (internal
quotation omitted). When a party invoking federal jurisdiction
fails to demonstrate a proper case or controversy, “courts have no
business deciding it, or expounding the law in the business of
doing so.” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341
(2006).
Thus, the doctrine of standing serves to identify
appropriate matters for judicial resolution and is a core
component of the Article III case or controversy requirements.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
To establish standing, the Constitution requires that a
plaintiff bringing a suit in federal court satisfy three elements.
Id. at 560. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it has
suffered an injury that is concrete and particularized and actual
and imminent. Id. Additionally, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant. Id. Finally,
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the plaintiff must demonstrate it is likely, and not merely
speculative, that a favorable decision from the court would
provide redress for the injury. Id. The State of New Union has
not met this burden.1
B. New Union’s claimed injury is neither actual nor
imminent under the traditional standing test, or
the relaxed standard from Massachusetts.
New Union claims its injury is the potential contamination of
the Imhoff Aquifer. But New Union has not offered any facts to
show that it will suffer an injury that is actual or imminent.
Proving an injury-in-fact requires more than showing injury to a
cognizable interest. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563. It also requires
showing that the party seeking relief is among those actually
injured. Id. Moreover, the injury must be “real and immediate.”
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (internal quotation
omitted).
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the imminence requirement
in Lujan offers a useful illustration for the case at bar. 504 U.S.
at 563-64. The plaintiff in Lujan, organizations dedicated to
wildlife preservation, offered affidavits from two of its members
to show injury. Id. at 563. These members traveled to Egypt and
Sri Lanka to view animals on the endangered species list. Id.
The same members alleged they were injured by development
projects that would increase the rate of those animals becoming
extinct, with the result being that the members would have a
more difficult time viewing the animals on return trips. Id. The
respondents in that case were unable to show injury, though,
because neither member of the wildlife organization was able to
specify definitive plans to go return to Egypt or Sri Lanka. Id. at
563-64.
The Lujan court rejected the respondents’ claim of injury for
failing the actual or imminent test. Id. at 564. According to the
court, professing an “inten[t] to return to the places they had
1. Nor does New Union benefit from bringing its suit under the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006). “Congress may grant an
express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential
standing rules.” Allen, 468 U.S. at 501. Nonetheless, a federal statute cannot
relieve a party bringing suit from showing the Article III requirements. Id.
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visited . . . is simply not enough.” Id (internal quotation omitted).
A lack of concrete plans or “specification of when the some day
will be do[es] not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’
injury that our cases require.” Id. The respondents were unable
to show through “specific facts” that their members would be
directly affected by the actions of the appellant. Id. at 563.
New Union also claims that it has a special interest as an
affected state, attempting to invoke the more relaxed test for
standing found in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518-20, but
it does not even meet this relaxed standard. There, the court
indicated that Massachusetts was “entitled to special solicitude”
in determining whether or not it met Article III standing
requirements. Id. at 520. Massachusetts claimed injury would
result from rising sea levels that would swallow the state’s
coastal property. Id. at 522-23. According to the majority that
decided the case, states are not “normal litigants for the purpose
of invoking federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 518. The majority
concluded that states have an independent interest in their
quasi-sovereign capacity. Id.
Notwithstanding the fact that four of the justices dissented
from the majority’s view that states are subject to a relaxed
standing test, the majority in Massachusetts relied on many more
specific facts alleging injury than New Union offers in this case.
For example, the petitioners in Massachusetts offered statements
that “qualified scientific experts [had] reached a strong
consensus” that global warming would cause injury by raising sea
levels. Id. at 521 (internal quotation omitted). Additionally, the
petitioners offered facts to show that sea levels had already
begun to rise. Id. at 522.
As a result, New Union cannot show that it has suffered an
injury, because it has not offered specific facts sufficient to meet
the traditional Article III standing analysis or the relaxed
standard from Massachusetts. The DOD munitions project has
not started, thus New Union must rely on showing an imminent
threat of injury. New Union hypothesizes that contaminated
water from the munitions project will reach the Imhoff Aquifer on
the bare fact that land between the aquifer and Lake Temp is
primarily unconsolidated alluvial fill. Order at 5. But aside from
that conclusory statement, New Union has not offered further
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evidence to prove that contaminants will ever reach the portion of
the aquifer below its soil. Order at 5-6.
Moreover, New Union claims that it can collect information
to track the movement of pollutants with the installation of
monitoring wells. Id. at 6. However, New Union to date has not
filed an application with DOD for permission to do so. Id. Unlike
the concrete facts of scientific consensus and rising seal levels
that the petitioners in Massachusetts were able to offer, New
Union has offered nothing more than circumstantial evidence
that pollutants from the munitions project might one day reach
the Imhoff Aquifer. Accordingly, New Union has not met its
standing requirements requiring injury in fact.
C. Nor Does New Union have standing under a theory
of parens patriae.
Causes of action under the parens patriae theory are rooted
in the common-law concept of the “royal prerogative.” Snapp &
Son v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982). The royal
prerogative included the right or responsibility to take care of
persons unable to take care of themselves. Id. “This prerogative
of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State
[and] is . . . often necessary to be exercised in the interests of
humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot
protect themselves.” Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,
57 (1890).
However, the current concept of parens patriae standing as it
has developed in American law is different from that common-law
approach. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 600. Parens patriae
standing is separate from an allegation of injury under Article
III. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448-449 (1992).
“[T]o maintain [a parens patriae] action, the State must
articulate an interest apart from the interest of particular private
parties, i.e., the State must be more than a nominal party.”
Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607. The Supreme Court in Snapp
referred to this as a “quasi-sovereign interest[,]” one of which
concerned the physical and economic well-being of its citizens.
Id. In Snapp, the Supreme Court allowed a parens patriae action
for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to assert federally created
rights against private defendants. Id. at 610 n.16. In contrast,
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however, “[a] State does not have standing as parens patriae to
bring an action against the Federal Government.” Massachusetts
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-486 (1923). According to the Court
in Mellon, it is not within a State’s power to enforce rights
against the federal government. Id. “In that field it is the United
States, and not the State, which represents them as parens
patriae.” Id. at 486.
New Union seeks to enforce the rights of the rancher Dale
Bompers, who claims the value of his ranch will be diminished if
the aquifer is contaminated. Order at 6. As stated above, though,
New Union cannot bring a parens patriae action against the
government. Even if New Union were able to bring a parens
patriae action against the federal government, it would still be
unable to demonstrate that Dale Bompers has suffered an injury.
His property lies over the Imhoff Aquifer, but he does not draw
water from there and has no definite plans to use it in the future.
Id. It is hard to see exactly how Dale Bompers suffers any actual
or imminent injury at all. Furthermore, New Union has not
alleged facts that allege the aquifer is currently being used or will
be by residents of the state. The water in the aquifer is not
potable or able to be used for agricultural purposes. It follows,
then, that New Union is unable to meet standing requirements
under a theory of parens patriae.
D. New Union’s failure to object to issues that should
have been raised in the EIS process estopps it
from seeking judicial review of the Corps’ decision
to issue § 404 permit.
Allowing New Union to proceed with this suit without raising
objections to the EIS circumvents the procedures set out in
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370H, for resolving objections to the
proposed munitions project. Facing an analogous situation, the
Supreme Court stated in Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 764 (2004), “[p]ersons challenging an
agency’s compliance with NEPA must structure their
participation so that it . . . alerts the agency to the [parties’]
positions and contentions.” Doing so allows an agency to “give
the issue meaningful consideration.” Id.
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The underlying policy of this rule is to prevent courts from
substituting their “judgment for that of the agency on matters
where the agency has not had an opportunity to make a factual
record or apply its expertise.” New Mexico Environmental Imp.
Div. v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 825, 835 (10th Cir. 1986).
Considerations of governmental efficiency necessitates that
courts respect agency decisions “unless the administrative body
not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the
time appropriate under its practice.” United States v. L.A. Tucker
Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952). But see City of
Seabrook, Tex. v. United States EPA, 659 F.2d 1349, 1360-61 (5th
Cir.1981) (holding that plaintiffs are not required to comment or
participate before challenging agency action).2
Here, the Corps followed standard NEPA procedures and
followed public notice requirements throughout the EIS process.
Order at 6. Moreover, all relevant information concerning Lake
Temp and the Imhoff Aquifer at issue in the district court order
was included in the EIS. Id. Despite those efforts, the State of
New Union failed to make any objection to the EIS. Id. As a
result, considerations of fairness and respect for the Corps’
decision to issue the permit require that New Union’s claims
against it be estopped.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DECIDED
THAT LAKE TEMP IS SUBJECT TO CWA
JURISDICTION.

The CWA provides the Corps jurisdiction to issue permits for
the discharge of dredge or fill material into navigable waters.
CWA § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The term navigable waters is
defined as “waters of the United States.” CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(7). The Supreme Court issued a fractured opinion in
2. City of Seabrook held that potential litigants generally should not be
estopped based on failure to object during a notice and comment period. Id. at
1360-61. However, that rule presupposes that objecting during the notice and
comment period preserves a right to contest an agency action. Big Horn Coal Co.
v. Temple, 793 F.2d 1165, 1170 (1986) (Barrett, J., specially concurring). The
concurrence instead reasoned that a litigant should be estopped from objecting
to an agency action unless the litigant can demonstrate it is constitutionally
infirm or in excess of statutory authority. Id. Neither of those exceptions are
the case here.
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Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), that guides the
interpretation of the term “waters of the United States.” An
opinion authored by Justice Scalia for a four-vote plurality
established a “continuous surface connection” test. Id. at 730-39.
A concurrence by Justice Kennedy established a “significant
nexus” test. Id. at 779-84 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The four
dissenting Justices argued for jurisdiction under either of two
tests, and in other instances as well. Id. at 787-810 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
The holding of the district court, and the correct application
of the CWA to Lake Temp, is not based on either of the Rapanos
tests, but a definition of navigable waters that all the Supreme
Court Justices agree on. Thus, this Court need not reach a
decision on the Rapanos split to resolve this case.
A. The district court correctly held that Lake Temp is
“within the description of water bodies that have
traditionally been held to be navigable.”
The entire Supreme Court agrees that the term “navigable
waters” encompasses something more than traditionally
“navigable-in-fact” waters, thus Lake Temp is properly classified
as a navigable-in-fact water. Id. at 731 (plurality opinion); id. at
767 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 792 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army
Corps Of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 167 (2001); United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985); United
States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1216 (11th Cir. 2007). The
traditional definition established in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557,
563 (1870), is that waters must be used or susceptible of use, in
their ordinary condition, as a highway for commerce in the
customary modes of trade and travel. The waters do not need to
be open to navigation “at all seasons of the year, or at all stages of
the water.” Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S.
113, 122 (1921). In Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971),
the Supreme Court held that the Great Salt Lake was navigable
in fact because “nine boats [were] used from time to time to haul
cattle and sheep from the mainland to” an island. Despite the
fact that the Great Salt Lake was not a part of an interstate or
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international commercial highway, “[t]he lake was used as
highway and that is the gist of the federal test.” Id.
Similarly, the district court found that Lake Temp is a part
of a highway of interstate commerce used by out-of-state hunters
who boat and paddle canoes on the lake. Lake Temp meets The
Daniel Ball test because “for over one hundred years” the lake
has been used, in its ordinary condition, as a highway for boaters
traveling from out of state to hunt birds on a shore with no road
access. Order at 7. It is not significant that Lake Temp shrinks
in dry years because waters do not need to be navigable “at all
season of the year” to be navigable in fact. Econ. Light & Power,
256 U.S. at 122.
Moreover, Lake Temp is more closely connected to interstate
commerce than the Great Salt Lake in Utah v. United States. In
Utah, the lake was not “a navigable highway in the customary
sense of the word” because no commercial operator ran a
shipping, ferry, or barge operation. 403 U.S. at 11. Similarly,
Lake Temp is not used to ship commercial goods in interstate
commerce. Yet, because a few boats used from time to time to
haul intrastate livestock over a lake satisfies The Daniel Ball test,
so too does Lake Temp’s long history of use by interstate hunters.
Thus, Lake Temp meets the traditional definition of a navigablein-fact water.
B. The lakebed, where the Corps’ project will take
place, is subject to CWA jurisdiction.
CWA jurisdiction extends to Lake Temp’s ordinary high
water mark, and thus includes dry sections of the lakebed. The
CWA provides that the federal government can substitute state
for federal jurisdiction over “navigable waters . . . other than
those waters which are . . . susceptible to use in their natural
condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport
interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high
water mark.” CWA § 404(g)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (emphasis
added). By denying state jurisdiction over navigable waters
“shoreward to their ordinary high water mark,” Congress
intended to retain federal CWA jurisdiction over the area
between the shore and high water mark of waters susceptible to
use in interstate commerce. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731
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(Plurality opinion interpreting CWA jurisdiction over navigable
waters based upon this subsection of the act); id. at 768
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (interpreting CWA jurisdiction over
navigable waters based on this clause). Because Congress
inserted a provision retaining federal jurisdiction over these
areas, it follows that Congress intended these areas to be a part
of federal CWA jurisdiction in the first place.
The CWA grants federal jurisdiction to navigable waters
below their ordinary high water mark. A lakebed is defined as
the “bottom of a lake.” New Oxford American Dictionary 948
(Erin McKean ed., 2d ed., 2005). The bottom is below the high
water mark, and the proposed activity will take place on the
lakebed of Lake Temp. Order at 4. Thus, the proposed activity on
the lakebed is subject to CWA jurisdiction.
C. In the alternative, if the Court finds that the lake
is navigable in fact and the dry portions of the
lakebed are not a part of the lake, then the dry
portions of the lakebed meet the significant nexus
test.
If the court finds that Lake Temp is navigable under The
Daniel Ball test, but that the dry portions of the lakebed are not
a part of the lake, then the dry portions are subject to CWA
jurisdiction as adjacent wetlands under the significant nexus test.
Here again, the Court may come to this decision without reaching
the issue of which interpretation of Rapanos to embrace. Two
Circuit Court interpretations of the Rapanos decision exist: the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits concluded that the significant
nexus test alone creates CWA jurisdiction, while the First and
Eighth Circuits concluded that either creates CWA jurisdiction.
United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 724–25
(7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208, 1221–22
(11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 62–64
(1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th
Cir. 2009). No part in this case asserts, and no circuit court has
held that the plurality test alone creates jurisdiction. Thus, this
court may conclude that CWA jurisdiction exists under the
significant nexus test without deciding if the plurality’s
continuous surface connection test is also applicable. See Precon
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Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d 278, 288 (4th
Cir. 2011); Northern Cal. River Watch v. Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766,
781 (9th Cir. 2011) (allowing CWA jurisdiction under the
significant nexus test while reserving judgment on CWA
jurisdiction under the continuous surface connection test).
A wetland meets the “significant nexus” test if, “either alone
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, [it]
significantly affect[s] the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
‘navigable.’” Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Addressing a Corps standard that provides for jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters, Justice Kennedy
recognized that “the Corps’s conclusive standard for jurisdiction
rests upon a reasonable inference of ecologic interconnection, and
the assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable
under the Act by showing adjacency alone.” Id. Later, he again
reiterated that “[w]hen the Corps seeks to regulate wetlands
adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, it may rely on adjacency to
establish its jurisdiction.” Id. at 782.
No party disputes that the area to be sprayed is directly next
to, or adjacent to, Lake Temp. Thus, if the Court finds that Lake
Temp is a navigable water, then it follows that the adjacent
lakebed is within the jurisdiction of the CWA because the
adjacent area meets the significant nexus test.
D. In the alternative, if the Court finds that the lake
is not navigable in fact, than either of the Rapanos
tests may be used to establish jurisdiction.
In the alternative, the United States asserts that under
Rapanos, either Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test or the
plurality’s continuous surface connection test can be used to
establish jurisdiction under the CWA. This interpretation is
supported by Justice Stevens in his dissent: “Given that all four
Justices who have joined this [dissent] would uphold the Corps’
jurisdiction in [all] cases in which either the plurality’s or Justice
Kennedy’s test is satisfied—on remand each of the judgments
should be reinstated if either of those tests is met.” Id. at 810
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). The circuit courts
that held otherwise rest their reasoning on United States v.
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Marks, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), where the Supreme Court held
that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds” (citations omitted) (internal quotation omitted). In the
Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ analysis, the significant nexus
test is the “narrowest grounds” for restricting federal jurisdiction.
Gerke, 464 F.3d at 724-25; Robison, 505 F.3d at 1221-22.
Following the dissent’s instruction will yield a result that
most closely follows what would happen if the Supreme decided
each case before it. If the waters at issue meet the significant
nexus test, then the four members of the dissent in Rapanos and
Justice Kennedy would vote to uphold jurisdiction under the
CWA. If the waters at issue meet the continuous surface
connection test, then the four members of the dissent and the
four members of the plurality in Rapanos would vote to uphold
jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court, voting on each test
individually, would allow CWA jurisdiction under either test,
thus this Circuit should follow the First and Eighth Circuits in
adopting the Rapanos dissent’s instruction and allow CWA
jurisdiction under either test.
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits’ reasoning is not
compelling because it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
which test upholds jurisdiction on a narrower ground. Bailey, 571
F.3d at 798 (“Because there is little overlap between the
plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s opinions, it is difficult to
determine which holding is the narrowest.”). Narrower grounds
can be characterized as a test that restricts federal jurisdiction in
a subset of the situations under which the other test restricts
federal jurisdiction. See Johnson, 467 F.3d at 63.
The “narrower grounds” rationale is not applicable here
because one test in Rapanos is not a subset of the other. There
are certain waters, for example, a small creek with a continuous
surface connection to a large navigable water, that would be
subject to CWA jurisdiction under the continuous surface
connection test, but possibly not under the significant nexus test.
On the other hand, a large area of wetlands upstream from a
traditionally navigable body of water likely has a significant
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nexus with that body of water. Yet if the wetlands do not contain
a surface connection to the body of water, CWA jurisdiction will
not attach under the plurality’s test. Accordingly, the one test
cannot be viewed as “narrower grounds” than the other because
neither is a subset of the other. The term narrowest grounds “as
used in Marks does not translate easily to [Rapanos]. The cases
in which Justice Kennedy would limit federal jurisdiction are not
a subset of the cases in which the plurality would limit
jurisdiction.” Id. at 64.3 Accordingly, Marks is not an appropriate
standard to decide CWA jurisdiction in the wake of Rapanos.
If the Court finds that the lake is not navigable in fact, then
following Justice Sevens’ instruction either of the Rapanos tests
may be used to establish CWA jurisdiction. Following Marks is
not compelling because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine which test upholds jurisdiction on narrower grounds.
Following the dissent’s instruction will yield a result that mirrors
what would happen if the Supreme adjudicated each fact pattern
that emerges.
E. Lake Temp is a relatively permanent body of
water and thus meets the Rapanos plurality’s test.
The plurality’s test:
requires two findings: first, that the . . . channel contains a
‘wate[r] of the United States,’ (i.e., a relatively permanent body of
water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters); and
second, that the wetland has a continuous surface connection
with that water, making it difficult to determine where the
‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.

Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 742. Lake Temp meets the first part of the
plurality’s test, and the second part of this test is not applicable
to Lake Temp because it is a lake and not wetlands.
The first part of the plurality’s test requires that the lake be
a “relatively permanent, standing . . . body of water forming [a]
geographic feature[] described in ordinary parlance as [a] lake.”
Id. at 732. “At bare minimum, [this includes] the ordinary
3. The Johnson Court additionally cited confusion regarding what exactly
the term “narrowest grounds” means. 467 F.3d at 63.
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presence of water.” Id. at 734. The outer bounds of the plurality’s
test is set out in footnote 5 of the Court’s decision: “[C]hannels
containing permanent flow are plainly within the definition, and
[intermittent or ephemeral streams] whose flow is [c]oming and
going at intervals[, b]roken, fitful, or existing only, or no longer
than, a day; diurnal[,] short-lived, are not.” Id. at 733 n.5
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Lake Temp meets all the elements of this test. The lake is an
established feature of the area, having been used by boaters for
over one hundred years, and thus is “relatively permanent.”
Additionally, no party disputes Lake Temp’s status as a lake; its
name and depiction on maps lends credibility to this view.
Accordingly, the lake is a geographic feature described in
ordinary parlance as a lake. The lake is only dry approximately
one out of every five years, thus Lake Temp ordinarily includes
the presence of water. Finally, Lake Temp falls within the outer
bounds of the test as described in footnote 5 of the Court’s
decision because it is normally flowing and dries out only, on
average, twice a decade.
In conclusion, the district court properly decided that Lake
Temp is subject to CWA jurisdiction because it is “within the
description of water bodies that have traditionally been held to be
navigable.” In the alternative, dry portions of the lakebed meet
the significant nexus test. Either of these conclusions can be
made without deciding which interpretation of Rapanos to adopt.
If this Court decides to address the Rapanos split, it should hold
that either test creates jurisdiction under the CWA. Additionally,
Lake Temp satisfies the plurality’s continuous surface connection
test because it is a relatively permanent body of water forming a
lake. The District Court decision regarding the navigability of
Lake Temp should be affirmed.
III.

THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED
THAT THE CORPS PROPERLY ISSUED A CWA
§ 404 PERMIT.

Under the CWA, only the Corps has authority to issue
discharge permits under § 404, and both the Corps’ and EPA’s
interpretations are consistent with this understanding of the
statute. Moreover, the slurry that DOD proposes to discharge
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falls squarely within the definition of fill material that both
agencies have promulgated. As a result, the district court was
correct in holding that the permit was properly issued under §
404.
A. When the Corps has authority to issue a CWA § 404
discharge permit, EPA does not have concurrent
authority to issue a CWA § 402 discharge permit.
“The [Clean Water] Act is best understood to provide that if
the Corps has authority to issue a permit for a discharge under §
404, then . . . EPA lacks authority to do so under [section] 402.”
Coeur Alaska, Inc. v. Se. Alaska Conservation Council, 129 S. Ct.
2458, 2467 (2009). The CWA grants both the Corps and EPA
regulatory authority under a dual-permitting scheme. 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1342(a)(1), 1344(a). The Corps has authority to grant permits
for discharges of “fill material,” and EPA has authority to grant
permits for discharges of pollutants. Id. Specifically, EPA may
issue permits for the discharge of any pollutant, “[e]xcept as
provided in section . . . 1344.” Id. As a result, Congress carved
out an explicit exception to EPA’s otherwise broad permitting
authority under CWA § 402.
When interpreting an individual statute, specific language
controls over more general language. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 335 (2002);
MacEvoy v. United States, 322 U.S. 103, 107 (1944). The plain
text of the statute prohibits EPA from issuing permits for actions
properly under the jurisdiction of the Corps pursuant to CWA §
404, regardless of whether a “fill material” can also be classified
as a pollutant.
B. The Corps’ authority to issue permits for
discharges of fill material is consistent with both
agencies’ interpretation of the CWA.
If the Court finds the plain language of the CWA to be
ambiguous, then the court should look to the agencies’
interpretation of the statute to resolve the ambiguity. See, e.g.,
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 758 (“Agencies delegated rulemaking
authority under a statute such as the Clean Water Act are
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afforded generous leeway in interpreting the statute they are
entrusted to administer.”) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984)). As a result, decisions of the agencies charged
with administering the CWA are entitled to deference.
Throughout the history of the CWA, the Corps and EPA have
issued rulemakings and other pronouncements demonstrating a
joint understanding that the Corps—and not EPA—has authority
to issue permits for “discharges of fill material.” Soon after the
CWA was enacted in 1972, EPA issued a regulation that states
“[d]redged or fill material discharged into navigable waters” does
“not require an NPDES permit.” 40 C.F.R. § 125.4(d) (1973).
Today’s regulations are similar. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2011) (Section
402 permits are not required for “[d]ischarges of . . . fill material
into waters of the United States which are regulated under
section 404 of CWA.”). Both agencies also stated in 1986 that
discharges meeting the definition of “fill material” are regulated
under § 404, even if they also have to meet the criteria of a § 402
discharge. 51 Fed. Reg. 8871 (March 14, 1986). Finally, both
agencies stated in the preamble to the 2002 fill rule that effluent
guidelines promulgated under §§ 304 and 306 applied to § 402
permits and that “EPA has never sought to regulate fill material
under effluent guidelines.” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129, 31,135 (May 9,
2002).
Both the Corps and EPA provided explanations for this
division of authority. According to both expert agencies charged
with implementing the CWA, the permitting regime under § 404
is fundamentally different by design. 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292, 21,293
(April 20, 2000). First, § 404 was written by Congress specifically
to regulate dredged material and fill material. Id. Additionally,
“fill material” is different from the broad category of pollutants
regulated under § 402 “because the principal environmental
concern [of fill permits] is the loss of the water body itself.” Id.
Additionally, Congress intended for § 404 to be the “vehicle for
regulating materials whose effects include the physical
conversion of waters to non-waters or other physical alterations
of aquatic habitat[.]” Id.
EPA is not shut out of the Corps decision to issue a permit
under § 404. Section 404 directs the Corps to specify each

19

2012]

BEST BRIEF: APPELLEE-CROSS-APPELLANT

93

disposal site for discharge permits through guidelines developed
by EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1). These guidelines, codified in 40
C.F.R. § 230 (2011), ensure that “fill materials” are not
discharged without the applicant demonstrating that a limited
impact on the aquatic ecosystem. 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(c). For
example, the guidelines direct the Corps to review practicable
alternatives to the proposed discharge, meaning no discharge at
all or “discharging into an alternative aquatic site with
potentially less damaging consequences[.]” Id. § 230.5(c).
Furthermore, Congress provided EPA a significant check on
the Corps § 404 permitting authority. Section 404(c) of the CWA
provides the EPA with the authority to “deny or restrict the use
of any defined area for specification . . . as a disposal site[.]” This
provision is known as the EPA veto. Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2465.
The guidelines and veto provision show that the Corps is required
to apply EPA guidelines when deciding to issue a § 404 permit,
but the decision to issue a § 404 permit remains the responsibility
of the Corps.
Notwithstanding the EPA guidelines and veto option, the
underlying conclusion of the rulemakings and agency
pronouncements mentioned above is that “discharges of fill
material” are exclusively regulated by the Corps under § 404.
C. The Corps has authority to issue the permit under
§ 404, because the proposed discharge falls
squarely within the definition of “fill material.”
Section 404 of the CWA grants the Corps exclusive authority
to issue permits for discharges of dredged or “fill material.” CWA
§ 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006); Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2467-69.
Congress did not provide a definition in the CWA for “fill
material.” However, the agencies have promulgated a rule to
bridge the gap left by Congress, which defines “fill material” as
“material placed in waters of the United States where the
material has the effect of (i) Replacing any portion of a water of
the United States with dry land; or (ii) Changing the bottom
elevation of any portion of a water of the United States.” 33
C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1) (2011) (Corps definition); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2
(2011) (EPA definition). Both agencies also provide a nonexhaustive list of activities that qualify as a “discharge of fill
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material.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (2011); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2011).
These joint regulations explicitly state that a “discharge of fill
material” includes “placement of overburden, slurry, or tailings or
similar mining-related materials[.]” Id. The decision for this
Court, then, is to decide whether or not the agencies have
constructed a rule that is consistent with the CWA.
1. The agencies’ definition of fill material is
controlling because it is a permissible
construction of the statute.
An agency interpretation is controlling unless plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the statute. Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997). “When a court reviews an agency’s
construction of the statute which it administers, it is confronted
with two questions.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. It first looks at
whether or not Congress has spoken directly to the question at
issue, and if Congress has provided a clear answer, then that is
the end of review, for both the agency and the court must follow
Congressional intent. Id. If Congress has not spoken directly to
the question at issue, then the court must determine whether or
not the agency’s rulemaking is a permissible construction of the
statute. Id.
Congress can delegate regulatory authority implicitly or
explicitly. Id. at 843-44. If the statutory gap is explicit, then
courts must defer to the agency interpretation “unless they are
arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute. Id. at
844. On the other hand, if the delegation of authority is implicit,
then courts should defer to agency interpretations that are
reasonable constructions of the statute. Id. Here, the agencies’
interpretation of the term “fill material” is made pursuant to an
implicit delegation.
As a result, the current definition of “fill material”
promulgated by the Corps and EPA is a reasonable interpretation
that is consistent with the CWA. In 2002, the Corps and EPA
jointly undertook an effort to redefine the definition of “fill
material.” 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002). Before 1977, both
agencies defined “fill material” as “any pollutant used to create
fill in the traditional sense of replacing an aquatic area with dry
land or of changing the bottom elevation of a water body for any
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purpose.” Id. at 31,131. Then, in 1977, the Corps modified the
definition by adding a “primary purpose test,” which excluded
discharges primarily intended to dispose of waste. Id. EPA, on
the other hand, defined “fill material” as any pollutant that
replaces a water of the United States with dry land or changes its
elevation for any purpose, retaining the effects-based definition.
Id.
The agencies explained that the effects-based approach was
selected over the “primary purpose” approach because of the
difficulty of making subjective determinations regarding the
purpose of potential discharges. 65 Fed. Reg. at 21,294 (April 20,
2000). The agencies reasoned that adopting an effects-based test
would provide for more objective decisions on whether to issue §
404 permits, as well as more consistent results. Id. at 21,294-95.
Accordingly, the effects-based definition that the agencies have in
place today is a reasonable interpretation of term “fill material.”
2. The proposed discharge meets the test set out
by the Supreme Court in Coeur Alaska, Inc.
Moreover, New Union’s attempt to distinguish the discharge
of fill material in this case from the discharge of fill material
described in Coeur falls flat. There, the defendant-mine operator
received a § 404 permit to discharge slurry from a mining
operation into a treatment lake. Coeur, 129 S. Ct. at 2463-64.
Ruling for the defendant, though, the Supreme Court explained
that the mining slurry at issue “falls well within the central
understanding of the term ‘fill’” and noted that the plaintiff had
even conceded that point. Id. at 2468. The plaintiff raised a
concern that this “interpretation of the statute will lead to
[section] 404 permits authorizing the discharges of solids [e.g.,
litter and battery manufacturing waste,] that are now restricted
by EPA standards.” Id.
The Court responded that those “extreme instances” were not
in front of the court and hinted at a potential exception to the
effects-based definition of “fill” by stating that, “the dispositive
question for future cases would be whether the solid at issue . . .
came within the regulation’s definition of “fill.” Id. The proposed
discharge by DOD is not one of those instances.
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The munitions slurry in this case is not the same category as
the mining slurry from Coeur, however the slurry is still well
within the definition of “fill material.” Later in the Coeur
opinion, the Court deferred to EPA’s conclusion that CWA §
306(e) performance standards did not apply to permits issued
under § 404. Id. at 2473. Relying on an internal EPA opinion, the
Court noted that “the instant cases do not present a process or
plan designed to manipulate the outer boundaries of the
definition of ‘fill material’ by labeling minute quantities of EPAregulated solids as fill.” Id. Nor does DOD’s proposed discharge
of munitions slurry. The record establishes that the munitions
project will have the effect of changing the bottom elevation of
Lake Temp. The project will raise the entire lakebed by an
estimated six feet, resulting in a two square mile increase in the
surface area of the lake. Order at 4. As a result, DOD cannot be
accused of proposing a discharge plan that intends to manipulate
the outer boundaries of what constitutes “fill material.”
3. The legislative history and an earlier
congressional statute regulating fill material
also support the conclusion that the proposed
munitions discharge falls within the definition
of fill material.
New Union suggests that, because some of the materials in
the munitions slurry are toxic pollutants, DOD’s proposed
discharge is different from the fill discharged in Coeur. Order at
8. But the legislative history shows that Congress intended for
discharges of “fill material” to be regulated by the Corps under
section 404, regardless of whether the fill material contained
toxic substances or not. In a Senate Report discussing the 1977
amendments to the Clean Water Act of 1977, Congress stated:
Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 required a permit program to control the
adverse effects caused by point source discharges of dredged or
fill material into the navigable waters including: (1) the
destruction and degradation of aquatic resources that results
from replacing water with dredged material or fill material; and
(2) the contamination of water resources with dredged or fill
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S. Rep. No. 95-370, at 74 (1977). Based on this report, Congress
foresaw the possibility that discharges of fill material could
contain toxic substances or destroy aquatic resources.
Furthermore, the Corps’ authority set out in the Rivers and
Harbors Act (RHA), the statutory predecessor to the CWA, is also
analogous to the current regulatory regime. Under the RHA, the
Corps has authority to regulate discharges of fill. 33 U.S.C. § 403
(2006). The Fourth Circuit held that RHA § 10 was “sufficiently
broad to prohibit the discharge of any fill material, including
waste, that would ‘alter or modify the course, location, condition,
or capacity’ of designated navigable waters.” Kentuckians for the
Commonwealth v. Rivenburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 442 (2003) (citations
omitted). The court rejected a definition of “fill material” limited
only to “material deposited for some beneficial primary purpose.”
Id. It follows then, that, regardless of the presence of toxic
pollutants in DOD’s proposed slurry, the discharge falls within
the definition of “fill material,” because it has the effect of
changing the bottom elevation of Lake Temp.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECIDED
THAT EPA’S DECISION DID NOT VIOLATE
THE CWA.

The district court properly upheld EPA’s decision not to veto
the Corps permit. The EPA, Corps, and Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) acted appropriately under the CWA’s veto
provision. CWA’s § 404(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006).
A. EPA properly consulted with the Corps under
CWA § 404(c).
EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was taken pursuant to
CWA § 404(c), which reads: “Before [a veto] determination, the
[EPA] Administrator shall consult with the Secretary [of the
Army].” Id. This provision is an explicit statutory mandate for
EPA to work with the Corps in evaluating the situation before
making a veto determination. OMB facilitated the consultation
process between EPA and the Corps. OMB’s participation in this
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process supported the consultation effort between EPA and the
Corps. Thus, because the consultation process is sanctioned by
the CWA, EPA’s participation in the consultation process was
proper.
B. In the alternative, EPA’s decision not to veto the
permit is not subject to judicial review.
In the alternative, EPA’s decision not veto the permit is a
wholly discretionary action and not subject to judicial review.
The Administrative Procedures Act exempts from judicial review
an “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by
law.” 5 U.S.C § 701(a)(2). “[A]n agency’s decision not to take
enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial
review under § 701(a)(2).” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985). EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was a decision not
to take enforcement action. Thus, the EPA’s decision not to veto
the permit is presumed immune from judicial review and should
be upheld. As the district court aptly noted: “The participation by
OMB in EPA’s decision did not violate the CWA, [and] did not
make EPA’s decision subject to judicial review[.]” Order at 10.
C. Even if EPA’s decision was subject to judicial
review, the decision not to veto the permit was not
arbitrary or capricious.
In the alternative, EPA’s decision not to veto the permit
should be upheld under the Administrative Procedure Act’s
deferential arbitrary and capricious standard. EPA’s decision
under CWA § 404(c) should only be found unlawful if “agency
action, findings, and conclusions” are “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). EPA’s decision was not arbitrary or
capricious because it is consistent with existing case law,
including Coeur, and a reasonable exercise of the President’s
constitutional Article II powers. Accordingly, this Court should
hold that EPA’s actions were legal under the Administrative
Procedures Act.
1. EPA’s actions were consistent with the

25

2012]

BEST BRIEF: APPELLEE-CROSS-APPELLANT

99

Supreme Court’s ruling in Coeur.
EPA’s actions were not arbitrary or capricious because they
were consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Coeur. In
Coeur, the Court held that the Corps has exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for fill materials under CWA § 404. Coeur, 129 S.
Ct. at 2468. EPA does not have authority to issue permits that
involve fill materials, but EPA may, in its discretion, veto a
permit issued by the Corps if inconsistent with conservation
priorities identified in the statute.
Accordingly, EPA’s
discretionary decision not a veto a Corps permit is consistent with
the limited authority that the Supreme Court found was given to
EPA in Coeur.
2. OMB’s involvement in the EPA-Corps
consultation is not arbitrary or capricious.
EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was taken pursuant to
CWA § 404(c), which reads: “Before [a veto] determination, the
[EPA] Administrator shall consult with the Secretary [of the
Army].” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2006). This provision is a mandate
for EPA to work with the Corps in evaluating the situation before
making a veto determination. The consultation process between
EPA and the Corps was facilitated by OMB. OMB’s participation
in this process supported the consultation effort between EPA
and the Corps. The Executive Branch’s use of a third-party
agency to aid statutorily-mandated consultation is neither
arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion. Thus, because
the consultation process is sanctioned by the CWA and OMB’s
participation in the consultation process was a proper way to
support EPA’s consultation reasonability, EPA’s decision not to
veto the permit was appropriate.
3. The President is empowered by the
Constitution to decide how to arbitrate
disputes between executive branch agencies.
EPA’s decision not to veto the permit was not arbitrary or
capricious because the executive power of the United States is
vested in the President. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. The
President is charged with duty to “take Care that the Laws be
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faithfully executed.” Id. art. II, § 3. This clause gives the
president the power to make decisions on any discretionary issue
reaching the executive branch, including conflicts between laws
and agencies. Thus, the Constitution gives the President the
power to resolve disputes between federal agencies in whatever
way she sees fit, including delegating the responsibility to a third
agency such as OMB.
In conclusion, EPA’s decision not to veto the permit did not
violate the CWA because the statute mandated the consultation,
or in the alternative, the decision is not subject to judicial review,
or the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
should be affirmed.
The district court property held that New Union does not
have standing to contest the corps’ issuance of a CWA § 404
permit. New Union lacks traditional Article III standing. New
Union’s claimed injury is neither actual nor imminent under the
traditional standing test, or the relaxed standard from
Massachusetts. Nor does New Union have standing under a
theory of parens patriae. New Union’s failure to object to issues
that should have been raised in the EIS process estopps it from
seeking judicial review of the Corps’ decision to issue a § 404
permit.
The district court properly decided that Lake Temp is subject
to CWA jurisdiction. The district court correctly held that Lake
Temp is “within the description of water bodies that have
traditionally been held to be navigable.” The lakebed, where the
Corps’ project will take place, is subject to CWA jurisdiction.
In the alternative, if the Court finds that the lake is
navigable in fact and the dry portions of the lakebed are not a
part of the lake, then the dry portions of the lakebed meet the
significant nexus test. In the alternative, if the Court finds that
the lake is not navigable in fact, then either of the Rapanos tests
may be used to establish jurisdiction. Lake Temp is a relatively
permanent body of water and thus meets the Rapanos plurality’s
test.
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The lower court correctly decided that the Corps properly
issued a CWA § 404 permit. When the Corps has authority to
issue a CWA § 404 discharge permit, EPA does not have
concurrent authority to issue a CWA § 402 discharge permit. The
Corps’ authority to issue permits for discharges of fill material is
consistent with both agencies’ interpretation of the CWA.
The Corps has authority to issue the permit under § 404,
because the proposed discharge falls squarely within the
definition of “fill material.” The agencies’ definition of fill
material is controlling because it is a permissible construction of
the statute. The proposed discharge meets the test set out by the
Supreme Court in Coeur. The legislative history and an earlier
congressional statute regulating fill material also supports the
conclusion that the proposed munitions discharge falls within the
definition of fill material.
The district court correctly decided that EPA’s decision did
not violate the CWA. EPA properly consulted with the Corps
under CWA § 404(c). In the alternative, EPA’s decision not to
veto the permit is not subject to judicial review.
Even if EPA’s decision were subject to judicial review, the
decision not to veto the permit was not arbitrary or capricious.
EPA’s actions were consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Coeur. OMB’s involvement in the EPA-Corps consultation is not
arbitrary or capricious. The President is empowered by the
Constitution to decide how to arbitrate disputes between
executive branch agencies.
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